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S E C R E T SANAA 000148

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/16/2014

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [AMGT](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [EAC](#)

SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - JANUARY 14, 2004

REF: REF: MISENHEIMER - S/S-O TELCONS

Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Begin Summary: The Ambassador convened a core Emergency Action Committee on 1/14 to discuss a shooting incident in Aden involving Yemeni security personnel and SOC/Yemen personnel. EAC members agreed, following initial investigation of the incident and apology offered to the Ambassador by the commander of Yemen's Special Forces, that the incident: (a) did not indicate a heightened threat for Amcits in Aden and (b) did not appear to justify cancellation of SOC/Yemen training for Yemeni security elements in Aden scheduled later this week. EAC members attending the meeting included AMB, DCM, RSO, MO, POL/ECON, POL/MIL, DAO, OMC, and SOC/Yemen.

2. (C) An Emergency Action Committee meeting was convened at 1700 hours on 01/14/2004 to review a security incident which occurred that same day at approximately 1445 hours, when two members of the SOC/Yemen training unit were shot at in Aden while traveling in a three-vehicle convoy consisting of two rental vehicles and a Yemeni military security vehicle. An initial investigation by Embassy Force Protection Units in Aden determined that the vehicles in the attacking motorcade contained uniformed members of Yemen's elite Presidential Guard, and that BG Ahmed Ali Saleh--commander of the Yemeni Special Forces (YSOF) and a son of President Saleh---was a passenger in the lead vehicle. Both motorcades stopped after the shooting and the Presidential Guard stated that they viewed the SOC/Yemen motorcade as a possible threat because it did not immediately pull over to the side of the road, and had Yemeni security personnel (actually YSOF personnel) in plainclothes who were carrying arms.

3. (C) During the EAC meeting the Ambassador advised committee members that BG Ahmed Ali Saleh, had called to apologize and offer an explanation of the event. BG Saleh claimed that due to the fact that the armed YSOF military escorts were not properly dressed and therefore were not easily identifiable by the Presidential Guards, they were perceived as a threat. Saleh also relayed to the Ambassador that the ROYG would determine the cause of the error and take measures to prevent any reoccurrence of this kind.

4. (C) The EAC decided that this was not a terrorist attack, and it was agreed that Americans need not be warned against travel to Aden. The EAC also determined that 1) The threat to Americans has not increased 2) Yemeni government officials have reacted in an appropriate and timely manner to this incident, and 3) That joint training exercises in Aden between American and Yemeni military units scheduled for later this week should continue as planned.

5. (C) The Regional Security Office is in contact with the Ministry of Interior regarding ROYG's ongoing investigation of the incident, which will include a meeting of all concerned U.S. and Yemeni organizations on the morning of January 15th. Members of the DAO, FPD, and SOC/Yemen will conduct further inquiries into the matter through liaison with members of the Yemeni security apparatus, and will participate actively in the ROYG investigation.

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